State of Utah v. andrew George Kish, aka William Walter  Snyder : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972
State of Utah v. andrew George Kish, aka William
Walter Snyder : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.J. Macarthur Wright; Attorneys for AppellantVernon B.
Romney, David S. Young, David R. Irvine; Attorneys for Respondent
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Kish, No. 13004 (Utah Supreme Court, 1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3293
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
vs. ) Case No. 
) 
ANDREW GEORGE KISH, ) 13004 
a./k/a WILLIAM WALTER ) 
SNYDER I ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. ISSUES 
1. Failure to Appoint Separate 
Counsel for Appellant. 
2. More Severe Sentence Imposed 
Upon Appellant Because He Demanded His 
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial. 
3. Failure of Cour~ to Categori-
cally Exclude for all Purposes an 
Improperly Obtained Statement Allegedly 
2 
Made _ey Appellant. 
4. Failure of Prosecutor to Indorse 
Witnesses Upon the Information and to 
Indorse the Names of Other Witnesses 
Upon the Information Until the Morning 
of Trial. 
3 
II. STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, Andrew George Kish, 
also known as William Walter Snyder, 
hereinafter referred to as "Kish" or 
"Appellant", was arrested with two other 
men, Charles William Morris and Lloyd 
Plaz Vincent, Jr., and charged with 
"Attempt to Commit the Crime of Robbery 
with a Deadly Weapon". The charge was 
subsequently amended to read "Assault 
with Intent to Commit Robbery". 
III. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The two other defendants pled guilty 
to a lesser charge and Defendant, Kish, 
after trial before a jury, was found 
guilty of said charge and sentenced to 
a term of five (S) years to life. 
T 
4 
IV. RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of his 
conviction. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, Andrew Kish was 
arrested in an automobile (TR. p. 881, 
1,12) on the 4th of February 1972 (TR. 
p. 86, L. 17) along with two other men, 
Charles William Morris and Lloyd Plaz 
Vincent (TR. p. 88, 11. 18-20). There 
were also two females in the car when 
Defendant was arrested (TR. p. 87, 11. 
23), neither of whom were ever identi-
fied during the trial. 
A prosecuting witness, Albert Dean 
Stock, testified that at approximately 
3:00 a.m. of the morning of February 4, 
1972, an automobile in which he saw only 
three occupants, drove into his Chevron 
T 
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Station and asked for gasoline, that he 
filled the tank and was presented with 
an American Oil Credit Card. The Wit-
ness testified that though American Oil 
Credit Cards were often mistakenly given 
to him, and were acceptable by Chevron 
Dealers in some states, he could not 
accept the card. When the driver indica-
ted he did not have cash, the Witness 
stated ~e suggested they wait until the 
American Oil Station across the street 
opened and that he was sure he could 
clear the charge through their machine. 
That would be a three or four hour wait. 
The Witness testified that the car 
pulled to a parking spot, that the car 
was in bad shape and it was cold and he 
hated to see them have to run the car 
to keep warm, so suggested they move it 
into the Service Station Bay. Sometime 
later three men came from the Bay, one 
I 
' 
I 
I 
I 
t 
I 
I 
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carrying a knife, robbed him, tied him 
up and departed after rifling the money 
box. Moments later he loosened himself 
and contacted the police and sometime 
thereafter Appellant, Vincent and Morris 
and two girls were arrested in an auto-
mobile on Highway I-15 East and North ~f 
St. George. (TR. pp. 23-32) 
Appellant, Kish, was taken to St. 
George, Washington C~unty Police Station 
by the arresting officers. There a 
statement was taken from Kish by officer 
Jerry Sandburg of the St. George Police 
Department (TR. Hearing held March 17, 
1972, p. 41 Et. Seq.) 
Subsequently Jim R. Scarth, Esq. was 
appointed to represent Charles William 
Morris (Preliminary Hearing TR. p. 4, 11. 
10-11) and Darwin C. Fisher, Esq., was 
appointed to represent the Defendants 
Lloyd Plaz Vincent, Jr., and Appellant, 
7 
Kish (Preliminary Hearing TR. p. 4, 11. 
16-17). 
A Preliminary Hearing was held on 
the 10th day of February, 1972 in the 
District Courtroom at St. George, Utah 
(Preliminary Hearing TR.) The co-
defendant Charles William Morris was 17 
years of age and had only turned 17 a 
few days before the Preliminary Hearing 
was held. (Pre 1 iminary Hearing TR. pp. 
6, 11, 8-10). 
Ultimately J. MacArthur Wright, 
Esq., was substituted as attorney in the 
place of Fisher, Esq., for Kish, the 
Appellant herein, and for Lloyd Plaz 
Vincent, Jr., co-defendant, in the pro-
ceedings below. 
Subsequent to the Preliminary 
Hearing, various motions were filed on 
behalf of the three co-defendants 
including the Appellant herein, including 
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a Motion to Substitute Counsel on behalf 
of the Appellant, Kish, and a Motion to 
Suppress certain evidence on behalf of 
all three of the co-defendants,Morris, 
Vincent and the Appellant, Kish. (TR. 
dated March 17, 1972) 
With respect to the Motion to Sub-
stitute Counsel, the Court severed the 
case for trial between the Defendant 
Vincent represented by counsel J. 
MacArthur Wright, Esq., and Appellant, 
Kish, also represented by the same coun-
sel, and denied the Motion to Substitute 
Counse 1 (TR. dated March 1 7, 1972, p. l~ 
11. 6-7). 
However, the Motion to Substitute 
Counsel was renewed by Counsel for the 
Appellant, Kish, on the morning of the 
trial, March 20, 1972, in Chambers, when 
it was indicated for the first time that 
the co-defendant, Vincent, would be 
9 
called as a witness on behalf of the 
State against the Appellant, Kish. (TR. 
p. 14, 1.30 and pp. 15, 11, 1-22). 
During all times pertinent hereto, 
the undersigned Counsel represented both 
the co-defendant, Vincent, and Appellant, 
Kish. During the times after his assuming 
the defense of the said two co-defendants, 
Vincent and Kish, said Counsel engaged in 
a series of negotiations with the County 
Attorney of Washington County and the 
District Attorney, representing the State 
of Utah, with the intent of obtaining an 
agreement with the State whereby one or 
both of the Defendants might plead guilty 
to a lesser charge than that then cur-
rently lodged against them. 
The co-defendant, Vincent, did sub-
sequently plead to a lesser charge (see 
TR. dated March 17, 1972, p. 12, 1.14 and 
p. 13, 1.7) 
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At the same time that these negotiations 
were going on, Counsel was also negotia-
ting with Counsel for the State in an 
attempt to obtain from him a recommenda-
tion t~ the Court that, upon a plea of 
guilty by the co-defendant, Vincent, the 
sentence would be suspended pending, and 
for the sole purpose of permitting 
authorities from the State of Kentucky, 
from which State the Defendant, Vincent, 
was wanted as a parole violator to come 
and return Vincent to the State Reforma-
tory of that State. Ultimately such a 
recommendation was made by the District 
Attorney, and a similar request was made 
by Counsel for the co-defendant, Vincent, 
to the Court. Thereafter the Court did 
suspend the sentence of Defendant, Lloyd 
Plaz Vincent, Jr., conditioned upon the 
authorities from the State of Kentucky 
coming after the said Vincent and 
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returning him to Kentucky to serve the 
balance of his term in the Kentucky 
State Reformatory. 
At the same time, Counsel for 
Appellant, Kish, had informed him of the 
possibility that a similar reduction could 
probably be obtained on his behalf in 
exchange for an agreement to plead guilty 
to said lesser charge if he so desired to 
do so. (TR. March 17, 1972 p. 3, 1.13 to 
p. 4 1.1). 
Out of these negotiations by Counsel 
on behalf of the co-defendant Vincent and 
the Appellant, Kish, arose the Petition 
for Appointment of Separate Counsel by 
Appellant as reflected in the hearing 
held March 17, 1972 (See TR. March 17, 
1972, p. 2 to p. 4). 
On March 20, 1972 co-defendant 
Vincent did plead guilty to a lesser 
charge, Assault with a Deadly Weapon and 
12 
the Appellant, Kish, was scheduled for 
trial before a jury on the charge of 
Assault with Intent to Commit Robbery. 
On that same day prior to the convening 
of the jury for the trial of the Appel-
lant, Kish, the Court ruled on the 
Motions to Suppress Evidence which had 
been previously filed and argued before 
the Court, denying the same as to all 
items except an alleged statement taken 
from Appellant, Kish, on the morning of 
his arrest at the police station in the 
City of St. George. (TR. p. 2, 1.21-
p. 5, 1.6). At the time, however, the 
Court stated that the statement which it 
had ruled inadmissible, might be used for 
impeachment purposes in the event the 
Appellant, Kish, were to take the stand 
in his own behalf. (TR. p. 4, 1.25-p. 5, 
L. 1) . 
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Thereafter on the same morning 
after the jury had been examined and 
qualified and sworn, the Court granted 
the motion of the State's Attorney to 
permit the filing of an amended infor-
mation in the matter against the 
Appellant, Kish. At that time it was 
learned by the Counsel for Appellant 
and the Appellant, himself, that wit-
nesses were intended to be called by the 
State who had not been indorsed on the 
Amended Information nor any of the pre-
vious informations that had been filed 
by the State's Attorney in the case prior 
thereto. (TR. p. 12, 1 13- p. 14, 1.19) 
Objection was made to the filing of the 
Amended Information without the indorse-
rnent of all witnesses to be called by 
the State upon it, and the Court granted 
the Motion of Appellant's Counsel to have 
all such witnesses indorsed upon said 
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Amended Information. At that point in 
time, it was learned by the Appellant 
and his Counsel that the State intended 
to call as a witness against the Appel-
lant, the co-defendant, Lloyd Plaz 
Vincent, Jr. (TR. p. 14, 11.20-25}. 
Thereupon Counsel for the Appellant 
renewed his objection to the Court's 
failure to appoint separate counsel for 
the Appellant, Kish, based upon the fact 
that Counsel was in fact representing the 
co-defendant, Vincent, whom it was now 
learned was possibly going to be called 
as a witness for the State, and a Motion 
for Mistrial was made by Counsel for the 
Appellant. (TR. p. 15, 1, 10-12}. 
The Court denied the Motion for a 
Mistrial on the grounds that the co-
defendant, Lloyd Plaz Vincent, Jr., had 
not yet and may not actually be called, 
even though he was indorsed, as a witness 
15 
by the State, upon the Amended Informa-
tion. 
The Appellant, Kish, thereupon 
plead not guilty to the Amended Informa-
tion (TR. p. 19, 11.27-28) and the trial 
on the charge was immediately thereafter 
held. The Appellant called only one 
witness in his defense, Albert D. Stock, 
as an adverse witness, who had previously 
been called as a witness for the State. 
(TR. p. 154, L. 13), and did not take the 
stand himself, (TR. p. 164, 1.26 - p. 
165, 1.9) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the 
Appellant was found guilty by the jury 
and a verdict of guilty was ordered by 
the Court. (TR. p. 173, 11.22-24). 
On April 19, 1972, the Appellant was 
sentenced to incarceration in the Utah 
State Penitentiary for a period of time 
not less than five years and which may 
16 
be for 1 i fe. (Sentencing Transcript, dated 
April 19, 1972, p. 6, 11.19-22). 
VI. ARGUMENT 
1. Failure to Substitute Separate 
Counsel for Appellant. 
The Appellant, Andrew George Kish 
and co-defendant Lloyd Plaz Vincent, Jr., 
having both been arrested and charged 
with the crime of Assault with a Deadly 
Weapon with the Intent to Commit Robbery, 
being indigent and unable to afford to 
hire Counsel, were appointed Counsel by 
the ccimmitting magistrate of Washington 
County. The Counsel appointed was 
appointed for both Defendants. 
A series of negotiations were ini-
tiated by Counsel for Appellant and his 
co-defendant with the State's Attorney. 
At the onset, a slight difference 
in the goals of the two co-defendants 
17 
existed. Vincent, was, regardless of 
disposition of charges here, a parole 
violator from the State of Kentucky and 
he soon made it evident to his Counsel 
that it would be his desire to be sent 
back to Kentucky, even though he would 
have to be reincarcerated there, pri-
marily because he would be closer to 
his family and friends and hoped that 
the prison environment there would be 
more conducive to his rehabilitation 
than being incarcerated such a long 
distance from his family and others 
interested in his welfare in the State 
of Utah. 
The Appellant, Kish, had no such 
motivation, and in fact insisted upon 
his innocence of the charges filed 
against him. 
Counsel, while engaged in negotia-
tions with the State's Attorney, was 
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faced with the implication that an agree-
ment to accept a plea on a lesser charge 
by the Defendant, Vincent, might be 
accepted only if both co-defendants 
agreed to do the same. Though this 
turned out not to be the case, it was a 
constant consideration in the mind of 
Counsel in his attempt to make the de-
sired arrangements on behalf of his 
client, Vincent. 
At the same time, Counsel in his 
attempt, to adequately and to the best 
of his ability, represent the Appellant, 
in a trial of the matter which became 
necessary when the Appellant desired not 
to enter a plea of guilty even to a 
lesser charge and to assert his inno-
cence of the charges filed against him, 
was still faced with the necessity of 
avoiding upsetting the delicate negotia-
tions involving his second client, 
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Vincent. Therefore, that consideration 
inevitably loomed, in Counsel's mind, 
in his dealing with his client, Kish. 
Furthermore, when Counsel's efforts 
on behalf of Vincent, were close to 
fruition, additional complications 
entered the picture, when, it became 
apparent that, after a plea of guilty to 
a lesser charge by co-defendant, Vincent, 
the State's Attorney, previously unbe-
known to Appellant's Counsel, intended 
to call said co-defendant, Vincent, as 
a witness against the Appellant, Kish. 
Even though, at that point, an 
agreement had been reached whereby 
Vincent would be allowed to plead to a 
lesser charge, there still remained the 
question of whether or not a suspended 
sentence would be granted to him whereby 
he might be returned to the State of 
Kentucky and reincarcerated in the 
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Reformatory in that State, closer to his 
home, family and friends, rather than in 
Utah. That issue still remained to be 
resolved and obviously would not be for 
several days after the trial of the 
Appellant, Kish, who was scheduled to go 
on trial the morning of the day in which 
Vincent was to plead guilty to the lesser 
charge. 
At this point Counsel for both co-
defendants was plagued with an additional 
dilemma. If Vincent were placed on the 
witness stand, either by the State or by 
the Appellant, Kish, and if there were 
an attempt by the Appellant, Kish, to 
cast the blame or the major responsibil-
ity for the alleged offense upon the 
co-defendant, Vincent, as would be the 
logical tactic under the facts as related 
to Counsel by Kish. Counsel would be 
faced with the position of attacking one 
21 
client for the benefit of another client 
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an untenable position under any circum-
stance. Furthermore, such a course of 
conduct on behalf of the Appellant, Kish, 
might easily have upset the delicate 
balance of negotiations and the chance of 
obtaining a suspended sentence for and on 
behalf of co-defendant, Vincent. 
Even though Appellant, Kish, through 
his Counsel, did in fact express objection 
to the placing of Vincent upon the witness 
stand during his trial, it nevertheless, 
under other circumstances might have been 
to Kish's advantage to call Vincent to 
the stand where his Counsel might have 
the opportunity to engage in a probing 
and incisive cross-examination of 
Vincent had Kish have had independent 
Counsel. 
Because of the dilemma that Counsel 
for both co-defendants found himself in, 
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the decision, after discussion with 
Kish, was made to try to avoid having 
Vincent placed upon the stand as a wit-
ness, partly because of the conflict, 
and partly because of the threat that 
if Vincent took the stand and chose to 
attempt to enhance his chances for a 
suspended sentence by testimony he con-
sidered favorable to the State's case, 
the Appellant would certainly then have 
to take the witness stand himself and 
rebut such implication of the co-defend-
ant, Vincent, and Kish would then be 
faced with the threat of having the 
previously suppressed statement admitted 
to impeach him as will be more fully 
explored in Section 3 below. 
In Commonwealth v Wheeler, 281 A. 
2d 846, 444 Pa. 164, on page 847, is 
found the following statement, 
"It is axiomatic Constitutional 
23 
Law that the Sixth Amendment 
Guarantee of effective assist-
ance of counsel requires inter 
alia, that an attorney repre-
senting multiple defendants not 
be faced with conflict of 
interest. 
'In Whitling we reversed the 
Supreme Court, which had placed 
the burden on the accused to 
demonstrate that ineffective 
representation was a consequence 
of the conflict of interest, and 
pertinently stated, if in the 
representation of more than one 
defendant, a conflict of interest 
arises, the mere existence of 
such conflict vitiates the pro-
ceedings even though no actual 
harm results. The potentiality 
that such harm may result rather 
than that such harm did result, 
furnishes the appropriate 
criterion. 1 " (emphasis added). 
The Appellant herein believes that 
that statement of the law most precisely 
fits the situation that developed in the 
proceedings prior to and during the trial 
in the District Court below in this case. 
While both the Appellant, himself, and 
his Counsel moved to have separate coun-
sel appointed, said motion was denied by 
the District Court and Counsel was faced 
24 
with the potential conflict of interest. 
Counsel, even in his explanation to 
the Court, below, of the potential con-
flict was faced with the further concern, 
in arguing for the Motion to Appoint 
Separate Counsel, that until he knew his 
loyalty would be to only one or the other 
of the two men he now represented, he 
could not say anything to the Court, in 
support of the Motion to Appoint Separate 
Counsel, that might in fact be harmful or 
deleterious to the cases of one or the 
other of his two clients. 
Therefore, Counsel though certainly 
not desiring to withhold information from 
the Court, was unable to argue and 
expound upon the reasons for the appoint-
ment of a separate counsel for the 
Appellant, Kish, as freely and candidly 
as he might have done had he not also 
had to bear in mind the interests of his 
25 
other client, Mr. Vincent. 
In People v Ramsey 95 Cal. Rptr. 
231 on page 233 is found this enlighten-
ing statement, 
"In examining the record we 
look not only for manifesta-
tions of actual conflict, but 
for areas of potential con-
flict. This is because the 
appointment of a single counsel 
may mask the conflict between 
co-defendants and it makes no 
difference whether the conflicts 
may have been apparent to the 
participants at the time of the 
trial or not." (emphasis added) 
In the present case, Appellant con-
fided to his Counsel that he had been 
picked up, as a hitchhiker, a few days 
before, by the other four occupants of 
the car, and that on the night in 
question, he had been sleeping in the 
automobile when it was pulled into the 
service station garage to help keep the 
occupants warm while they waited for a 
service station across the street to 
26 
open. 
He further stated that he was 
awakened out of a deep sleep and while 
still partly groggy from sleep was led 
into the office portion of the service 
station by the other two male occupants 
of the automobile, where he first fully 
realized that one of his companions had 
a knife and the purpose of the sally 
into the station office was to rob the 
attendant. He stated to Counsel that he 
yelled at the other two to put the knife 
away and to stop, but that it was appar-
ent by that time that things had already 
gone too far and that the scheme hatched 
by the other two men in the car could, 
or would not be halted. Kish, having 
no funds of his own, no transportation 
and alone in the middle of a winter's 
night in a strange town, felt at that 
moment, rightly or wrongly, that he had 
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no choice but to remain with his com-
panions and take a chance on getting out 
of town with them. 
That story was never told and does 
not appear anywhere in the record and 
whether it was true or whether it would 
have been believed by the jury were it 
told, will never be known. Kish reported 
at various times to his Counsel that his 
co-defendants, prior to the trial some-
times indicated willingness to verify 
his story and at other times indicated 
that they would not. 
Without the freedom to actively and 
vig~rously cross-examine co-defendants, 
and with the threat of a statement being 
used against him, which had been obtained 
while Kish was unrepresented, without 
proper advice as to its ramifications 
and while he was plunged in virtual mental 
incapacity by the fear, despair and 
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confusion brought on by the night's 
events, and which was found by the Court 
to be sufficiently tainted as to be 
inadmissible, Kish was trapped into 
being unable to fully, completely lay 
before the jury his defense. 
The Court attempted to resolve the 
conflict by severing the cases of the two 
defendants and giving separate numbers to 
the cases involving the co-defendant, 
Lloyd Plaz Vincent, Jr., and the Defend-
ant, Andrew George Kish. However, the 
court in Commonwealth v Booker, 280 A.2d 
561 stated that where dual representation 
continued throughout the trial, the con-
flict of interest was not cured by 
granting a severance. 
In the instant case it may be 
argued that because one Defendant either 
had agreed to or had plead guilty, prior 
to the trial of the Appellant, that the 
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question of the conflict is less impor-
tant than it might otherwise be. 
However, in Commonwealth v Shank 281 A. 
2d 746 the Appellant there, was 
sentenced immediately after testifying 
for his co-defendant and assuming much 
of the blame. In that case he was rep-
resented by the same attorney who 
represented the co-defendant for whom 
he had testified. There, like here, the 
Appellant in that case, had also plead 
guilty earlier to the charge as did the 
co-defendant, Vincent, here, whom it 
must be remembered, was still Counsel's 
client. He was granted a severe penalty 
and the Court held that the conflict of 
interest in the same attorney represent-
ing both defendants was too great to 
overlook and that the potentiality that 
harm might result from joint representa-
tion by Counsel rather than that such 
30 
harm did actually result furnishes the 
appropriate criterion for determining 
whether there was a conflict of interest 
prejudicial to the Defendant. 
In this case, the Appellant, Kish, 
argues that the precise situation existed, 
in that the potentiality for conflict did 
in fact exist and that therefore the pro-
ceedings should be wiped clean from the 
slate and the Appellant's conviction 
should be reversed. 
The writer of this brief, who was 
also Kish's Counsel in the trial below, 
wishes to state that he made a sincere 
and desperate attempt to be fair to all 
concerned in the trial below, to the 
Court, and to his two clients, and that 
only after lengthy reflection has the 
full impact of the ramifications of the 
untenable position in which Counsel and 
Appellant were placed during the trial 
31 
and the prior negotiations, become 
apparent to the writer. 
2. More Severe Sentence Imposed 
Upon Appellant Because He Demanded His 
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial 
The Appellant, because he insisted 
upon his innocence and required a jury 
trial, a right all are entitled to who 
are accused of committing a crime, under 
the American system of justice, ended up 
with a harsher penalty than did his co-
defendants in this case. It is hardly 
equitable that one who insists upon his 
constitutional rights must be penalized 
for doing so. This is most true when 
two or more are arrested for the same 
crime and under identical circumstances, 
but one finally ends up with the harsher 
penalty than do the others. 
Courts have condemned policies 
which require that one, insisting upon 
--
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his rights, be punished more severely 
if he is nevertheless found guilty, 
than one who decides not to take the 
chance and pleads guilty to a lesser 
charge. See: Gillespie v State, 355 
p. 2d 451; and United States v Wiley 
267 F. 2d 453. 
It is easy to see the potential 
abuse which can come to the rights of 
defendants when such an unhappy result 
occurs to him who asks for a trial. 
In the present case, the Appellant, 
Kish, believed his involvement was 
different than and less culpable than 
those with whom he was arrested and 
demanded a trial, even though his com-
panions accepted an opportunity to 
plead to lesser charges, and as a result 
ended up with the harshest sentence of 
all! 
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There is no evidence that his guilt 
was greater than the others, so that 
though his unhappy plight came about as 
a result of a common practice, in the 
field of criminal prosecution and defense--
Plea Bargaining--the result in this case 
was a most unfortunate miscarriage of 
justice insofar as Appellant was concerned. 
3. Failure !2_y Court to Categori-
cally Exclude, for all Purposes, an 
Improperly Obtained Statement Allegedly 
Made l2.y_ Appellant 
The Appellant, Andrew Kish, moved, 
prior to trial, for the exclusion of an 
alleged statement taken from him by 
certain arresting officers during 
the morning of his arrest. The Court, 
after taking testimony determined that 
the statement was improperly obtained 
from the Appellant and that it was not 
admissible. Had the Court gone no further, 
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the Appellant would have no quarrel on 
this point; however, the Court, upon 
the insistance of the Prosecuting Attorney, 
went further, and, in the opinion of the 
Appellant, totally destroyed the affect 
of the suppression of the statement, by 
making this statement, 
"Now, I am not ruling on that, Mr. 
Wright, (whether or not the state-
ment would be admissible for the 
purpose of impeaching the Defend-
ant, Andrew Kish, in the event he 
were to take the stand in his own 
defense) and I think you should 
know that in the event the Defend-
ant, William Walter Snyder, 
(Andrew George Kish) gets on the 
witness stand it may be that upon 
a proper presentation the District 
Attorney can use that for impeach-
ment purposes and you may stand 
forewarned of that fact." 
(emphasis added) (TR. p. 4 1 25-
3 0) • 
Though the Court did mitigate the 
effect of the statement to a certain 
extent by stating that the, " .•. statement 
may, upon proper presentation be used for 
impeachment purposes," the possibility 
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was distinctly presented to the Appellant 
and his Counsel that a statement which 
was otherwise fou~d to be improperly ob-
tained and therefore should be suppressed 
might resurface--be resurrected--at a 
point when it could and would cause 
possibly far more damage to the Defendant 
than if it had been initially admitted. 
Vfuether a Defendant should take the 
stand in a criminal case is always a 
decision of great significance and in-
volves one of the most sensitive decisions 
to be made by the Defendant and his 
Counsel. Regardless of the innocence of 
a particular Defendant, because of 
foreign and alien factors and other rea-
sons totally unrelated to his guilt or 
innocence, to take the witness stand and 
submit to cross-examination may do more 
to convict a man than all other evidence 
presented. By the same token, a good 
36 
presentation as a witness, might have 
the opposite effect. 
Whatever might have been the effect, 
however, of the Appellant appearing as a 
witness in his own defense, it might have 
been completely nullified or discredited 
by the use of a statement which had pre-
viously been ruled to have been improperly 
obtained and inadmissible in the trial. 
The use of the word "forewarned" by 
the Court in stating to Appellant and his 
Counsel that the statement might be used 
if he were to take the stand, could only 
inhibit him and greatly influence the 
decision by him and his Counsel whether 
he should or should not take the stand 
and testify. It would appear axirnnatic 
if the statement were tainted to the 
extent that it is inadmissible for one 
purpose it would be inadmissible for the 
purpose suggested by the Court, that is, 
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as an impeachment weapon by the State. 
In People v Byrd 266 p2d 505, 42C 
2d 200 Cert. Denied 75 S.Ct. 73, 348 
U. S. 848, 99 L. Ed. 2d 668, the Court 
on page 510 stated, 
"The portion of Defendant's 
argument which is directed to 
the point that an involuntary 
confession may not be used 
either for the purpose of 
proving the crime confessed or 
for the purpose of impeaching 
the Defendant is sustained by 
authority." 
Even though the question of whether 
to put a Defendant on the stand in his 
own defense is a delicate question, it 
is well within common knowledge that in 
most cases it is to the distinct disad-
vantage of the Defendant if he does not 
take the stand in the eyes of a jury of 
laymen, and any such external factors 
such as the warning involved in this 
case should not be imposed upon the 
Defendant or his Counsel in making that 
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important decision. 
Furthermore, in this case, the 
decision to take the stand or not to 
take the stand, was influenced not only 
by the warning by the Court, concerning 
the previously suppressed statement, but 
also by the implied threat that if the 
Appellant, Kish, were to take the wit-
ness stand, the co-defendant, Vincent, 
who had already plead guilty to a lesser 
charge, would be called as a witness for 
the State and Appellant and his Counsel 
would be again confronted with the dilemma 
of the dual representation by Counsel, all 
of which served, cumulatively, to dis-
courage the Appellant, Kish, from taking 
the witness stand in his own behalf. 
In People v Speaks 319 p. 2d 709, 
156 C.A.2d 25, the Court after a lengthy 
explication of the fact situation, said 
on page 715, 
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"Procedure similar to that 
followed in the present case--
introducing the alleged con-
fession by way of impeachment 
and by way of rebuttal, without 
proof that it was voluntary--
was condemned in People v 
Rodrigues 58 Cal. Ap. 2d 415, 
at page 418, 136 P2d 626, at 
page 628 at which this court 
said: 'The alleged confession 
to Officer Story was not offered 
as a part of the People's case 
in chief. It was held back to be 
offered in rebuttal and in the 
guise of impeachment of Defendant 
and after his denials upon cross-
examination. Apparently both 
Counsel and the Court considered 
this to be a proper procedure. 
Not only that, but it appears to 
have been assumed that a confession 
enlisted by way of impeachment was 
admissible without proof that it 
had been given voluntarily ...• it 
was no more proper for the District 
Attorney to offer the evidence as 
rebuttal after the Defendant's 
denial of the alleged statements, 
under the pretense that it was 
offered to impeach the Defendant, 
than it would have been to offer 
it in rebuttal if the Defendant 
had not been questioned about it 
at all." 
In the present case, the alleged 
statement was not in fact used. But the 
Court warned that it might be used, and 
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in the opinion of the Appellant and 
Appellant's Counsel, they could not 
take the risk of the Appellant taking 
the stand and testifying and then upon 
the State's Attorney attempting to use 
the statement in an exercise in impeach-
ment, find that the Court would allow 
the use of the tainted statement. Con-
sequently the threat of using the state-
ment was a serious inhibiting factor in 
the decision whether or not Defendant 
should take the stand in his own defense. 
This statement by the Court clearly and 
definitely taints the entire proceeding 
and is justification for the reversal of 
the conviction of Appellant. 
3. Failure of Prosecutor to Indorse 
Witnesses Upon the Information and to 
Indorse the Name of Other Witnesses Upon 
the Information Until the Morning of 
Trial 
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Section 77-21-52 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) states as follows: 
"When an information or indict-
ment is filed, the names of all 
the witnesses or deponents on 
whose evidence information or 
indictment was based shall be 
indorsed thereon before, it is 
presented, and the prosecuting 
attorney shall indorse on the 
information or indictment at such 
time as the court may by rule, or 
otherwise, prescribe the names of 
such other witnesses as he pur-
poses to call. A failure to so 
indorse the said names shall not 
affect the validity or suffi-
ciency of the information or 
indictment, but the court in 
which the information or indict-
ment was filed shall, upon 
application of defendant, direct 
the names of such witnesses to 
be indorsed. No continuance 
shall be allowed because of the 
failure to indorse any of the 
said names unless such application 
was made at the earliest oppor-
tunity and then only if a 
continuance is necessary in the 
interest of justice." 
In the instant case when the Amended 
Information was prepared and filed on the 
morning of the trial, after the jury had 
been qualified and sworn, in chambers, 
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out of the presence of the jury, the said 
Amended Information included the names 
only of witnesses Albert Dean Stock, 
Hyrum Ipson, Joseph Pfoutz and George 
Anderson. (TR. p. 12, 11.29-30). 
Upon an inquiry being made by 
Appellant's Counsel whether or not those 
were the only witnesses to be called by 
the State, the Prosecuting Attorney 
advised that others would be called and 
the Appellant objected that the names of 
the additional witnesses had not been 
indorsed upon the Information as required 
by Section 77-21-52 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). The Prosecuting Attorney 
pointed out that other names had been 
provided in a Bill of Particulars. The 
additional name provided there, was George 
Lang. (See Bill of Particulars, Para-
graph 1.) 
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The Prosecuting Attorney then stated 
that, in addition to those already men-
tioned, he wished to indorse upon the 
Information at that late date the name 
of Lloyd Plaz Vincent, Jr., the co-defend-
ant in the proceedings before the Court. 
(TR. p. 14, 11.20-21) 
Also during the trial, the prosecu-
tion called as a witness, Joe Hutchings, 
a witness who had never been indorsed 
upon the Information or provided in the 
Bill of Particulars. 
Clearly these oversights or omissions, 
until the last moment before the trial 
cormnenced, or in the case of Joe Hutchings, 
during the trial, place the Appellant 
under an accumulating disadvantage when 
considered in conjunction with the fact 
that his Counsel had already been placed 
in a position of conflict, and with the 
fact that he, the Appellant, was faced 
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with a coercive influence in making rele-
vant and highly important decisions, due 
to the warning by the Court that the 
tainted statement might be admitted for 
impeachment purposes. 
Even though Section 71-2-52 states 
that a failure to indorse the said names 
shall not affect the validity or suffi-
ciency of the Information or Indictment, 
nevertheless, the statute is provided for 
a purpose and that purpose is to permit 
the Defendant to evaluate and consider 
possible testimony and make plans for his 
defense in advance and when that informa-
tion is denied him, that purpose is 
thwarted and an additional disadvantage 
is heaped upon the Defendant's burden 
which he must overcome in defending him-
self and obtaining justice. 
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VII.CONCLUSION 
Appellant strongly believes that 
where he was forced to share defense 
counsel, equally committed to represent-
ing a co-defendant with whom he had a 
conflict, not only as to the evidence 
concerning the alleged offense, but as 
to goals he desired to achieve through 
the court proceedings below, and where 
his other co-defendants, arrested at the 
same time, by pleading guilty to lesser 
charges, and who were at least equally 
involved if not more so, received lesser 
sentences than he received by asserting 
his claim to innocence, and where an 
inadmissible statement was held over his 
head in an improper and wrongful manner, 
causing an adverse influence, upon 
important and crucial defense decisions, 
and finally, where the untimely 
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indorsement of witnesses on the informa-
tion and outright failure to indorse on 
the information, one witness used by the 
Prosecutor, that the rights of Appellant 
have been so abused as to require in the 
interests of justice that the Appellant's 
conviction be reversed. 
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